What Are the Main Political Risks in the DRC in 2026?

The main political risks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2026 are institutional instability driven by the constitutional revision debate, resource nationalism in the mining sector, the unresolved conflict with AFC/M23 in the east, and intensifying competition between the United States, China and the European Union for Congolese critical minerals.

The DRC is the world’s largest cobalt producer and its second-largest copper supplier. That makes its politics a global supply-chain issue, not just a country risk. This briefing is updated every quarter.

Risk	Key actors	Main exposure for investors	Tellurian rating
Institutional instability and governance	Félix Tshisekedi, Union Sacrée, opposition, CENCO, Joseph Kabila	Policy reversals, contract and permit security	High, rising
Resource nationalism and mining code	Ministry of Mines, ARECOMS, CAMI, Gécamines, Parliament	Export quotas, mining code revision, joint-venture renegotiations	High
Eastern conflict	AFC/M23, Rwanda, FARDC, FDLR	Security, logistics, sanctions and supply-chain due diligence	Very high (Kivus), moderate (Haut-Katanga, Lualaba)
Geopolitical competition	United States, China, European Union, Rwanda, Qatar	Offtake terms, financing, preferential access regimes	Medium, rising

1. Institutional instability and governance risk

The central institutional risk in the DRC is the push to revise the 2006 constitution, which the opposition sees as a route to a third term for President Félix Tshisekedi.

Tshisekedi has been president since January 2019. He was re-elected in December 2023 and sworn in for a second five-year term in January 2024, which under the current constitution is his last. His Union Sacrée de la Nation coalition dominates Parliament, and Judith Suminwa Tuluka, the country’s first woman Prime Minister, has led the government since 2024.

In October 2024, Tshisekedi called the constitution unsuited to Congolese realities and announced a commission to review it. The opposition, including Martin Fayulu, Moïse Katumbi and Denis Mukwege, and the Catholic bishops’ conference (CENCO) oppose the project. They point to article 220, which bars any change to presidential term limits.

The process accelerated in 2026. The Union Sacrée launched a consultation on a possible revision in April. Parliament then adopted a law on the organisation of referendums, which the Constitutional Court declared compliant on 28 July 2026, with interpretive reservations on 13 articles. On 21 September, Tshisekedi asked the National Assembly to deliberate on the text again. A presidential ordinance of 13 September also created a committee to prepare a national dialogue, which the opposition says the presidency controls.

Relations with former president Joseph Kabila have broken down completely. The Senate lifted his immunity in May 2025, and on 30 September 2025 the High Military Court sentenced him to death in absentia for treason and links to AFC/M23. He remains in exile. Tensions also run through the ruling coalition: Vital Kamerhe resigned as President of the National Assembly in September 2025 under pressure from a petition, and Aimé Boji Sangara now holds the post.

What it means for investors: decisions on permits, taxes and contracts are highly centralised and can shift with political alignments. A referendum campaign would raise the risk of protests and of policy decisions driven by short-term political needs.

2. Resource nationalism and mining code risk

Resource nationalism is the most direct political risk for mining investors in the DRC: the state is using export controls, contract reviews and a new revision of the mining code to capture more of the value of its minerals.

The current framework is the 2018 Mining Code. It allows a 10% royalty on “strategic substances” such as cobalt, introduced a windfall profits tax, and raised the state’s free-carried interest in new projects from 5% to 10%.

• ARECOMS, the regulator of strategic substances, suspended cobalt exports in February 2025, then replaced the ban with quotas from 16 October 2025. For 2026 and 2027, the annual cap is 96,600 tonnes, of which 87,000 tonnes are allocated to producers and the rest is held as a strategic quota. Since July 2026, unused first-half quotas are forfeited and reallocated by the regulator.
• CAMI, the mining cadastre, grants, renews and revokes mining titles.
• Gécamines, the state mining company, is the Congolese partner in major joint ventures such as Sicomines. In 2024, the Sicomines deal with Chinese investors was renegotiated to raise infrastructure commitments from $3 billion to up to $7 billion.

A new revision of the code is now on the table. A bill introduced by MP Serge Chembo N’Konde, sent to the government for comment in June 2026, would amend more than 40 articles. It would expand state control over strategic minerals, allow strategic stockpiles, and introduce fines of up to $1 million and prison terms of up to 20 years. The Chamber of Mines held an emergency forum on 15–17 July 2026 and asked for an impact assessment before any new revision.

What it means for investors: fiscal and regulatory terms should be treated as moving targets. Export quotas, a possible new mining code and joint-venture renegotiations belong in the base case, not in the tail risks.

3. The eastern conflict: M23 and armed group dynamics

The conflict in eastern DRC is the country’s most acute security risk, and the Rwandan-backed AFC/M23 rebellion is its main driver.

M23, which joined the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) in 2023, seized Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, in early 2025. The United Nations has documented how M23 exploits mineral resources in the east and smuggles them into Rwanda. The region is also home to more than 100 other armed groups, including the FDLR, a Rwandan Hutu armed group whose neutralisation is central to the peace process.

Two diplomatic tracks run in parallel: the US-led Washington process between the DRC and Rwanda, and the Qatar-led Doha process between Kinshasa and AFC/M23.

Date	Process	Development
16–17 September 2026	Washington	DRC and Rwanda officials meet in Geneva to review implementation
17–21 August 2026	Doha	Government and AFC/M23 agree in Switzerland on a mechanism to review implementation
4 December 2025	Washington	Tshisekedi and Kagame sign the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity
15 November 2025	Doha	Government and AFC/M23 sign the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement
27 June 2025	Washington	DRC–Rwanda peace agreement signed

Implementation lags far behind signature. A major M23 and Rwandan offensive on Uvira in late 2025 derailed the process, and the United States responded with sanctions on Rwanda. Clashes between the FARDC and M23 continued in North and South Kivu through September 2026, and two key obligations, the neutralisation of the FDLR and Rwanda’s lifting of its “defensive measures”, had not been declared complete.

What it means for investors: the main mining hubs of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba are far from the front lines, but the conflict still affects them through national politics, sanctions risk and due diligence on minerals sourced from the east.

4. Geopolitical competition: US, China and the EU

The DRC has become a frontline in the global competition for critical minerals, and Kinshasa is balancing several partners rather than aligning with Washington or Beijing alone.

• China remains the dominant player. China is by far the DRC’s largest trading partner and processes most of its minerals, and Chinese groups such as CMOC, the world’s largest cobalt producer, Huayou Cobalt and Zijin hold major assets.
• The United States has tied peace diplomacy to economic engagement. Beyond brokering the DRC–Rwanda agreements, it signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Kinshasa on 4 December 2025. The pact gives US companies preferential access to a reserve of strategic assets, and qualifying projects can obtain a renewable 10-year fiscal stabilisation clause. On 10 July 2026, the Congolese government approved the concession for the DRC section of the Lobito Corridor, the rail link to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito, to Mota-Engil with support from the US Development Finance Corporation.
• The European Union faces criticism in Kinshasa over its February 2024 memorandum of understanding on critical raw materials with Rwanda, which Belgium called to suspend after the fall of Goma.
• Qatar has become a key mediator through the Doha process.

What it means for investors: the nationality of your partners, financiers and offtakers is now a political variable. US-aligned projects may gain fiscal and diplomatic protection, while all investors should expect tighter traceability and due diligence requirements.

What changed in the last 90 days (July–September 2026)

The most important change this quarter is that the legal path to a constitutional referendum is now largely in place, while the mining code is also back on the legislative agenda.

Date	Risk area	Development	Impact on risk
21 September	Governance	Tshisekedi asks the National Assembly for a new deliberation of the referendum law	→ Timing of a referendum remains uncertain
16–17 September	East	DRC and Rwanda officials meet in Geneva on the Washington Accords	→ Process alive, key obligations still unmet
13 September	Governance	Presidential ordinance creates a committee to prepare a national dialogue	↑ Opposition rejects a process run by the presidency
17–21 August	East	Government and AFC/M23 agree on a mechanism to review implementation of the Doha Framework	→ Small procedural progress, fighting continues
28 July	Governance	Constitutional Court declares the referendum law compliant, with reservations on 13 articles	↑ Removes a key legal obstacle to a referendum
28 July	East	Kinshasa signs a disarmament and cantonment protocol with the FDLR	→ Rwanda calls it a delaying tactic
15–17 July	Mining	Chamber of Mines holds an emergency forum on the draft mining code revision	↑ Industry warns of regulatory uncertainty
10 July	Geopolitics	Government approves the Lobito Corridor concession for its DRC section	↓ Strengthens the US partnership and export routes
1–5 July	Mining	Unused first-half cobalt quotas forfeited to ARECOMS amid a customs platform blockage	↑ Tighter state control over export volumes

Our read: governance risk is rising. A referendum is now legally possible, and the national dialogue is starting under presidential control. Mining risk remains high, with a possible new code and tighter quota rules. The eastern conflict shows procedural progress but no change on the ground.

What should investors monitor next in the DRC?

Investors should track a small set of leading indicators that show whether each risk is rising or easing:

Risk area	Signals to watch
Governance	The second deliberation and promulgation of the referendum law; the composition and calendar of the national dialogue; opposition and CENCO mobilisation
Mining	Parliamentary progress of the mining code bill; ARECOMS quota allocations for the second half of 2026 and for 2027; joint-venture renegotiations involving Gécamines
East	Implementation of the Washington and Doha commitments, including the FDLR process; changes in AFC/M23 territorial control; new US or UN sanctions
Geopolitics	Final signing of the Lobito concession; designation of Qualifying Strategic Projects under the US–DRC partnership; new Chinese or European financing

The single most important indicator for the next quarter is whether the government sets a date for a constitutional referendum.

Frequently asked questions

Is it safe to invest in the DRC in 2026?

Investing in the DRC carries high political risk, but that risk is very uneven. The copper and cobalt belt in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba is far from the eastern front lines, while North and South Kivu remain highly unstable. The key is a site-specific assessment rather than a country-wide judgment.

Who is the president of the DRC?

Félix Tshisekedi has been President of the DRC since January 2019. He was re-elected in December 2023 for a second term, which under the current constitution is his last.

Will Tshisekedi seek a third term?

He has not formally announced it. In May 2026, he said reflection on changing the constitution could not be forbidden, and that any revision would require a popular vote. The push to revise the constitution, the adoption of a referendum law in 2026 and the launch of a national dialogue have convinced the opposition that a third term is the goal. Article 220 of the current constitution bars changes to presidential term limits.

What is M23?

M23 (March 23 Movement) is a Rwandan-backed armed group active in eastern DRC, operating within the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). It seized Goma and Bukavu in early 2025. It is negotiating with Kinshasa through the Qatar-mediated Doha process.

What is the DRC Mining Code?

The Mining Code, revised in 2018, governs mining in the DRC. It allows a 10% royalty on strategic substances such as cobalt, includes a windfall profits tax, and gives the state a 10% free-carried stake in new projects. A bill to amend more than 40 of its articles was introduced in 2026.

Why does the DRC matter for critical minerals?

The DRC is the world’s largest cobalt producer and its second-largest copper supplier, and a major source of gold, tantalum and germanium. These minerals are essential for batteries, electronics and the energy transition.

Conclusion

The DRC combines exceptional mineral wealth with political risks that move fast and feed on one another: a constitutional debate entering its decisive phase, an assertive state in the mining sector, an unresolved war in the east and a great-power race for critical minerals. For investors, the question is not whether to take political risk in the DRC, but how precisely they understand it.

We update this briefing every quarter. For the framework behind our approach, read What Is Political Risk Intelligence and Why Does It Matter?

Need a site-specific view of your exposure in the DRC? Talk to our team.

About the author: Eli Foster is a geopolitical and security analyst covering political developments, conflict dynamics and emerging risks across Africa. His work focuses on regional security, governance and geopolitical shifts, providing insights into complex environments and their implications for international stakeholders.

Sources
• Radio Okapi: referendum law declared compliant with the constitution, 28 July 2026
• ACP: National Assembly September 2026 session and request for new deliberation of the referendum law
• Mediacongo: Union Sacrée launches constitutional reform consultation, April 2026
• Actualite.cd: national dialogue organising committee, 13 September 2026
• AllAfrica: opposition and CENCO positions on the constitutional revision, November 2024
• Reporter.cd: Kabila case one year after the verdict
• Al Jazeera: Kabila sentenced to death in absentia, September 2025
• Kitco/Reuters: Congo withdraws unused cobalt export quotas, June 2026
• Fastmarkets: ARECOMS on 2026–2027 cobalt quotas
• Mining Weekly/Reuters: planned mining law reform, July 2026
• Semafor: mining law reform and the US–DRC partnership, July 2026
• EITI: Sicomines renegotiation
• Al Jazeera: Geneva talks on the Washington Accords, September 2026
• US Department of State: joint statement on the Doha process, August 2026
• Security Council Report: DRC briefing, September 2026
• Critical Threats: Deadlock in the DRC
• Bruegel: the EU–Rwanda raw materials memorandum
• US Embassy Kinshasa: 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial
• US Bureau of African Affairs: Lobito concession approval, July 2026