How Does the M23 Conflict Affect Business Operations in the DRC?
The M23 conflict affects business operations in the DRC in five concrete ways: it disrupts supply chains and logistics in the east, puts mining concessions under the control or pressure of a rebel administration, raises security and insurance costs across the country, exposes companies to sanctions and conflict-minerals liability, and forces firms to deal with two competing tax authorities.
Since AFC/M23 captured Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu the following month, the rebels have run a parallel administration across large parts of North and South Kivu. Despite the Washington and Doha peace processes, that administration was still in place in September 2026. For decision-makers, the question is no longer whether the conflict will affect operations, but how, and at what cost.
| Impact area | What happens on the ground | Who is most exposed |
| Supply chains and logistics | Goma airport closed, banks shut, trade rerouted through Rwanda | Traders, distributors, FMCG, logistics firms in the Kivus |
| Mining concessions | Rebel taxes, forced suspensions, evacuation of sites | Tin, coltan and gold operators in North and South Kivu |
| Security and insurance costs | Political violence premiums up to 10x, higher security budgets | All operators, including copper-cobalt miners in the south |
| Compliance and sanctions | Expanding US and EU sanctions, conflict-minerals scrutiny | Buyers of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, refiners, end users |
| Dual authority | Rebel administration demands taxes that Kinshasa considers illegal | Any company or NGO operating in M23-held areas |
Where is business most exposed to the M23 conflict?
Business exposure to the M23 conflict is concentrated in North and South Kivu, but its effects reach the whole country through sanctions, insurance markets and national politics.
In the Kivus, the AFC/M23 controls major cities, including Goma and Bukavu, and has appointed its own provincial governors. At the height of its 2025 advance, it pushed as far west as Walikale, a tin-rich area in North Kivu. This is where the direct operational impact is felt: closed infrastructure, rebel taxation and the risk of fighting near sites.
The copper and cobalt belt of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba lies more than 1,000 km to the south and has not been affected by fighting. Operators there still feel the conflict indirectly, through higher insurance costs, tighter due diligence from buyers and financiers, and the political pressure the war puts on Kinshasa.
The practical rule: assess exposure site by site. A company’s risk depends on where its assets, suppliers and transport routes are, not on the country as a whole.
How does the M23 conflict affect supply chains and logistics?
The conflict has cut eastern DRC off from the rest of the country’s financial and transport systems, forcing companies to rely on slower, costlier and politically sensitive routes through Rwanda.
Three disruptions matter most for operations:
- Goma airport is closed. The airport, the main logistics hub for North Kivu, has been closed to normal traffic since January 2025. The rebels and Kinshasa blame each other: the government controls national airspace, while the AFC/M23 says only it can reopen the airport. In February 2026, a UN helicopter became the first aircraft to land there in more than a year.
- Banks are shut. All commercial banks in Goma closed after the city fell, and ATMs stopped working. A year later, they were still closed. Companies cannot pay suppliers or salaries through the formal banking system and must rely on costly cash and informal transfer channels.
- Trade has been rerouted. Goods from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania now largely reach Goma and Bukavu via Rwanda, a longer route. Imports from Rwanda have grown fastest, which deepens the region’s economic dependence on Kigali.
What it means for operations: any supply chain that runs through the Kivus should be mapped for single points of failure, such as one border crossing, one bank or one transporter. Contracts should anticipate payment, customs and transport disruptions.
How does the M23 conflict affect mining concessions?
For mining companies in the east, the conflict creates three risks: the rebels can take control of the concession, tax it, or force it to stop operating.
Control of production. The M23 has held the Rubaya coltan mines in North Kivu since late April 2024. These mines supply about 15% of the world’s tantalum. UN experts estimate that the group earns around $800,000 a month by taxing the coltan trade, and that the ore is smuggled to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production. M23 officials have since told Reuters they charge a 15% tax on the value of all ore leaving the mine.
Forced suspensions. Two cases show how quickly operations can stop:
| Company | Site | What happened | Outcome |
| Twangiza Mining | Gold mine, South Kivu | Ordered to suspend operations by the rebel administration in May 2025, in a dispute over taxes the M23 says the company never paid | Immediate work stoppage, equipment placed on standby |
| Alphamin Resources | Bisie tin mine, Walikale (about 6% of world tin supply) | Suspended operations on 13 March 2025 as the M23 advanced towards Walikale | Phased restart after the rebels withdrew; 2025 output guidance cut from 20,000 to 17,500 tonnes |
Legal limbo. Kinshasa does not recognise the rebel administration and considers its taxes illegal. A company that pays the M23 risks penalties from the government and exposure to sanctions. A company that refuses risks having its operations shut down. There is no legally safe option, only choices between risks.
What it means for operations: concessions in or near M23-held territory need suspension and evacuation plans, a clear policy on dealing with de facto authorities, and legal advice on sanctions before any payment is made.
How much does the M23 conflict add to security and operating costs?
The conflict raises costs for all operators in the DRC, including those far from the front lines, mainly through insurance premiums, security budgets and contingency planning.
- Insurance. Political violence insurance premiums in the DRC jumped by up to ten times after the fall of Goma, according to executives at SFA Congo, the country’s second-largest insurer, which covers about half of the country’s mining operators. The increase also hit copper and cobalt miners in the south. New reinsurers then entered the market, and premiums returned towards pre-crisis levels in early 2026. The lesson: insurance costs can spike overnight after a major military event.
- Security and contingency. Projects in or near the east must budget for more security personnel, alternative transport routes and emergency evacuation plans. These costs weigh more heavily as international peacekeeping capacity in the region declines.
- Financing and ESG. Exposure to conflict zones can lower ESG ratings, which in turn can tighten financing conditions and slow negotiations with offtakers.
What it means for operations: review political violence cover before tensions rise, not after, and stress-test budgets for a sudden rise in premiums and security costs.
What are the sanctions and compliance risks linked to M23?
Sanctions linked to the M23 conflict have expanded quickly since 2025, and they now reach beyond the rebels to traders, refiners and the Rwandan military. Any company buying minerals from the Great Lakes region is exposed.
| Date | Authority | Target |
| 25 June 2026 | US Treasury (OFAC) | Gasabo Gold Refinery in Kigali, its chairman and general manager, and three Rwandan mining companies, for refining gold smuggled from M23-held areas |
| 2 June 2026 | US Treasury (OFAC) | Commanders of M23 and the FDLR |
| 2 March 2026 | US Treasury (OFAC) | The Rwanda Defence Force and senior commanders, for supporting M23 |
| August 2025 | US Treasury (OFAC) | Mining cooperative CDMC and two Hong Kong trading firms, East Rise and Star Dragon, for buying coltan from militia-held areas |
The European Union had already sanctioned Gasabo Gold a year before the US did. The pattern is clear: enforcement is moving down the supply chain, from armed groups to the traders and refiners that buy from them.
The due diligence challenge is real. Minerals from Rubaya and other M23-held areas are not eligible for international trade, but UN experts and investigations by Global Witness have traced them into global supply chains after they were mixed with Rwandan production. For buyers of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, a “Rwandan” origin is no longer enough reassurance.
What it means for operations: screen counterparties against US, EU and UN sanctions lists at every tier, require mine-level traceability for 3TG minerals from the Great Lakes region, and document every payment made in M23-held territory.
What should decision-makers do now?
Companies exposed to eastern DRC should treat the M23 conflict as a lasting operating condition, not a temporary shock, and plan accordingly:
1. Map your exposure site by site. List every asset, supplier, transport route and payment channel that touches North or South Kivu, and identify who controls each area.
2. Set a policy on de facto authorities. Decide in advance how teams should respond to tax or permit demands from the rebel administration, with legal sign-off on sanctions risk.
3. Prepare suspension and evacuation plans. The Alphamin and Twangiza cases show that operations can stop within days. Plans should cover staff, site security, stockpiles and communication with buyers.
4. Diversify logistics and payments. Avoid dependence on a single border crossing, bank or carrier, and agree contract terms for force majeure and payment delays.
5. Strengthen supply chain due diligence. Apply mine-level traceability to 3TG minerals and rescreen counterparties after each new sanctions round.
6. Lock in insurance early. Review political violence cover and limits before the next escalation.
7. Monitor the peace processes closely. Progress or breakdown in the Washington and Doha processes is the main signal of whether the situation will improve or worsen.
Frequently asked questions
Does the M23 conflict affect copper and cobalt mining in the DRC?
Not directly. The copper and cobalt belt in Haut-Katanga and Lualaba is far from the fighting. But miners there have faced higher political violence insurance premiums, tighter buyer due diligence and the political fallout of the war in Kinshasa.
Is Goma airport open?
Goma airport has been closed to normal traffic since the M23 captured the city in January 2025. Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 disagree over who has the authority to reopen it. Companies should check its status directly before planning any operation that depends on it.
Can companies pay taxes to the M23 administration?
Kinshasa does not recognise the M23 administration and considers its taxes illegal. The M23 is under US and UN sanctions, so payments can also create sanctions exposure. Companies should take legal advice before making any payment in M23-held territory.
Which minerals are most affected by the M23 conflict?
The most affected minerals are coltan, the ore of tantalum, as well as tin and gold, which are mined in North and South Kivu. The M23-held Rubaya mines alone supply about 15% of the world’s tantalum.
How can companies avoid sourcing conflict minerals from M23 areas?
By requiring mine-level traceability rather than country-of-export declarations, screening suppliers and refiners against sanctions lists, and treating minerals declared as Rwandan with extra scrutiny, since UN experts have documented the mixing of Congolese ore with Rwandan production.
Conclusion
The M23 conflict is not just a security story. It closes airports and banks, halts mines, multiplies insurance costs and drags supply chains into sanctions risk, sometimes far from the front lines. Companies that map their exposure precisely and prepare for disruption in advance can keep operating. Those that treat eastern DRC as a single country-risk score will keep being surprised.
For the wider political picture, read What Are the Main Political Risks in the DRC in 2026?, and for our approach, What Is Political Risk Intelligence and Why Does It Matter?
Need to assess your operational exposure in eastern DRC? Talk to our team.
About the author: Eli Foster is a geopolitical and security analyst covering political developments, conflict dynamics and emerging risks across Africa. His work focuses on regional security, governance and geopolitical shifts, providing insights into complex environments and their implications for international stakeholders.
Sources
• Al Jazeera: Banks shut one year after M23 seized Goma, January 2026
• AllAfrica: Goma residents a year after the city fell to M23, January 2026
• KT Press: first aircraft at Goma airport in over a year, February 2026
• AllAfrica: Goma airport can only be reopened by AFC/M23, say rebels, November 2025
• The EastAfrican: How the M23 war has disrupted East Africa trade with Congo
• Global Witness: Who buys Rwanda’s smuggled coltan?, June 2026
• The Africa Report: Rubaya coltan mine at the heart of M23 financing
• Argus Media: Rubaya mine collapse and global tantalum supply
• Kitco/Reuters: Twangiza gold miner halts operations in tax dispute with M23, May 2025
• Mining Technology: Alphamin resumes operations at Bisie
• Mining.com: Alphamin cuts 2025 tin guidance
• Mining.com/Reuters: Congo fighting drove spike in insurance costs, February 2026
• The New Humanitarian: How M23 rebels finance their war, September 2026
• The New Humanitarian: M23 tax drive puts squeeze on aid groups, May 2026
• US Treasury: sanctions on Gasabo Gold Refinery, June 2026
• US Treasury: sanctions on M23 and FDLR commanders, June 2026
• Federal Register: OFAC sanctions actions of 2 March 2026
• US Department of State: sanctions on conflict mineral networks, June 2026
• Evidencity: OFAC designations of coltan traders